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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Using  a sample  of  foreign  ﬁrms  listed  in U.S.  and  delisting  shares
over  the  period  2000  and  2010,  this  paper  studies  the  impact  of
Sarbanes–Oxley  Act  (SOX)  on the  cross-delisting  behavior  of  for-
eign  ﬁrms  based  on  the  ﬁrm  characteristics,  legal  tradition,  overall
culture  and  degree  of individualism  of  the  country  of  domicile.  Pre-
SOX,  the  propensity  to  delist  is  lower  for  ﬁrms  from  countries  with
cultural  similarities  to  the U.S.  and  higher  for  ﬁrms  from  individ-
ualistic  societies.  Post-SOX  these  trends  are reversed.  Consistent
with  the  existing  research  we  ﬁnd  that  the  delisting  decision  of  for-
eign  ﬁrms  cross-listed  in  the  U.S.  is based  on  the  potential  gains
from listing  based  on  the  growth  opportunities,  length  of  presence
in the  U.S.  and  legal  regulations  of  the  country  of domicile.  Out
ﬁndings  provide  evidence  of the  cultural  factors  that  impact  the
competitiveness  of  U.S.  capital  markets.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Cross-listing behavior of foreign ﬁrms has been studied in both the ﬁnance and legal literature.
Existing research in ﬁnance has identiﬁed reasons for cross-listing in the United States ranging from
greater liquidity, enhanced capital access, increased transparency (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller,
1999; Doidge, 2004; Doidge et al., 2009b, 2004; Gozzi et al., 2008; Lel and Miller, 2008), to increased
visibility and prestige (Fernandez and Ferreira, 2008; Lee and Valero, 2010) among others. The legal
literature also offers an explanation; by cross-listing shares in the U.S. foreign ﬁrms bond themselves
with a stronger legal system which offers better investor protection and leads to increased reputation
and higher investor conﬁdence (Coffee, 2002, 1999; Abdallah and Goergen, 2008).
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Recently, there has been a trend of foreign delistings suggesting that U.S. has lost competitiveness
in the global ﬁnancial markets (Doidge et al., 2009a, 2010). A common reason often cited is increased
compliance cost after Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. SOX legislation increased the corporate
governance standards, mandating stricter disclosure and monitoring of accounting practices, in effect
raising the “rent” of U.S. listing by increasing compliance costs (Marosi and Massoud, 2008; Ribstein,
2003). It beneﬁted ﬁrms from countries with poor governance as it provided stronger bonding but at
the same time signiﬁcantly increased the cost of bonding. Post-SOX, foreign ﬁrms have been forced
to evaluate whether the additional regulatory requirements, with their associated costs, are worth
the beneﬁt (Pozen, 2004; Marosi and Massoud, 2008, 2007). SOX mitigates the private beneﬁts of
controlling shareholders and prior research suggests that ﬁrms delist/deregister when governance
standards and investor protection are weak (Leuz et al., 2008).
In this paper we highlight culture as an additional dimension that contributes to the delisting
decision of foreign ﬁrms. This premise is based on theory from institutional economics suggest-
ing that societal norms and cultural values impact economic interactions (North, 1990; Williamson,
2000). In particular we study cultural similarities between the U.S. and the country of domicile as
well as the level of individualism of the home country as a predictor of delisting decision. We  focus
on culture distance because it is shown to be an important factor in cross-listing activity around
the world (Licht, 2003a,b). Companies have a tendency to list in countries that are culturally sim-
ilar (Pagano et al., 2002), cross-listing activity is clustered regionally (Sarkissian and Schill, 2003),
cultural afﬁnities affect economic relationships (Rauch, 2001), and often geographical and cultural
factors dominate ﬁnancial motivations in cross-border security transactions (Portes and Rey, 2000).
We deﬁne cultural distance following Chakrabarti et al. (2009) as the Cartesian distance between
the U.S. and the country of domicile, based on the four most widely used dimensions of culture
developed by Hofstede (2001) – power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and individu-
alism.
In addition we focus on individualism (measured by the individualism index (Hofstede, 1980,
2001)) because it is directly related to the need of bonding with a stronger regulatory environment
and therefore the need to end (or maintain) cross-listing. In individualistic societies personal gain is
valued higher than the success of the group, leading to a higher risk of agency problems (Fidrmuc
and Jacob, 2010) and greater need for bonding with stronger regulations. Individualism is also directly
linked to the sense of personal ego and therefore with the overall risk aversion in managerial behavior.
We expect that the impact of culture on the delisting decision will be different pre- and post-SOX.
Cultural norms greatly inﬂuence the agency relationships across countries (Ekanayake, 2004; Johnson
and Droege, 2004; Morris et al., 2001). SOX was  introduced to improve transparency and visibility
in corporate governance therefore the degree of existing agency problems in a foreign country will
inﬂuence the need for bonding with SOX legislation (U.S. listing) and therefore impact the delisting
reaction to SOX. Pre-SOX greater culture distance leads to a decrease in the willingness of U.S. investors
to invest in foreign stocks and therefore we expect that foreign ﬁrms will have an incentive to maintain
the U.S. listing to gain recognition and therefore easier access to the U.S. capital markets. However post-
SOX, the cost of compliance might add an incentive for delisting especially for ﬁrms from culturally
distant countries that need to implement changes in the organizational components of their daily
operations in order to comply with SOX.
Furthermore, we expect that the impact of country degree of individualism on delisting will differ
pre- and post-SOX. Individualism is associated with conﬁdence and risk-taking behavior (Beugelsdijk
and Frijns, 2010; Shupp and Williams, 2008) and we  expect that pre-SOX U.S. listed foreign ﬁrms from
individualistic countries after raising initial capital will have a stronger desire to delist. Likely they will
be conﬁdent that they will be able to maintain high valuation even without the reputational boost
of cross-listing in the U.S. However, those foreign ﬁrms that continue to maintain a U.S. listing and
face SOX legislature will also exhibit conﬁdence and risk-taking behavior. Conﬁdence in this case is
associated with their belief in past decisions and their ability to maintain proﬁtability. These ﬁrms
will likely continue to maintain a U.S. listing and believe that they will manage to meet the costs
of compliance of SOX while maintaining a high valuation. Furthermore, individualistic societies are
associated with a higher degree of agency problems and greater need for legal bonding hence the need
to maintain the U.S. listing and foreign ﬁrms often cross-list in U.S. to improve investor conﬁdence, in
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the home market. SOX requirements provide a boost to investor conﬁdence, increasing the premium
for an exchange listing (Litvak, 2007a,b).
Several sections of SOX are directly related to the business practices and culture in the country of
domicile. For example, Section 301 of SOX assigns a direct responsibility for accuracy and reliability
of ﬁnancial statements to the CEO yet in several European countries this is performed by the Board
of Supervisors. Research in psychology suggests that when a group culture is faced with assigning
individual responsibility the overall performance signiﬁcantly deteriorates (Chen et al., 1998). In sev-
eral foreign countries the Board of Supervisors is responsible for auditing the ﬁnancials while SOX
requires independent outside auditors. This requirement is in direct contrast to the foreign countries
norms suggesting that the informal networking channels in foreign country may  function better than
adherence to strictly mandated rules of SOX.
Consistent with our expectations, our results suggest that culture distance and the level of indi-
vidualism exhibited by a foreign country does impact the ﬁrm’s likelihood to cross-list and eventually
delist after the SOX legislation. Pre-SOX ﬁrms from countries with cultural similarities to the U.S. were
less likely to delist while ﬁrms from individualistic societies exhibited a higher overall propensity of
delisting. SOX legislation introduced a shift in the costs/beneﬁts of listing and we observe that culture
characteristics lead to reversal of fortunes – our results suggest that post-SOX ﬁrms from countries
with cultural similarities to the U.S. are more likely to delist and ﬁrms from individualistic societies
are less likely to delist.
Overall, in this paper we provide a possible explanation for the loss of competitiveness of U.S. capital
markets. Our study suggests that in addition to the well established research on cost/beneﬁt of cross-
listing on the U.S. market from a legal and ﬁnancial perspective, culture and a measure of investor
conﬁdence impact the propensity of foreign ﬁrms to delist shares from the U.S. capital markets. The
SOX legislation created an opportunity to evaluate a shift in this set of determinants. In fact U.S. is
“culturally distant” from more than three quarters of the countries in our sample that have a distance
score from U.S. larger than half of the maximums. While pre-SOX cultural distance seemed to be a
determinant for cross-listing in U.S., post-SOX cultural differences lead to delisting.
SOX itself is not the only reason for the potential loss of competitiveness of U.S. capital markets.
In facts regulations similar to SOX are already implemented in foreign countries (such as C-SOX for
ﬁrms listed in Canadian and similarly J-SOX for Japan). Also, culture on its own does not motivate
the delisting behavior. It is combination of the “distant” U.S. culture and strict U.S. legislature that
contributed to the delisting behavior of foreign ﬁrms among other factors. This is important as it
allows to better understand the factors that motivate a public company’s listing/delisting decision,
investor preference and thus make conclusions about comparison of exchanges around the world.
Ultimately, social ties and informal institutions in a society function better, and may  lead to better
performance than adherence to formally mandated rules. This topic has received little to no attention
in the literature and may  explain the choice of listing location in response to the SOX legislation among
ﬁrms from different countries.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review of the cross-listing and
delisting process and the impact of SOX including the existing hypotheses from the cross-listing and
delisting literature, Section 3 provides the hypotheses development of this paper, Section 4 discusses
the data and Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Concluding remarks follow in Section 6.
2. Literature review
2.1. Value impact of cross-listing and delisting
There was a large number of cross-listed ﬁrms in the 1990s and early 2000 and there is extensive
literature on the beneﬁts for non-U.S. ﬁrms to cross-list shares in the U.S. – ﬁrms gain access to more
developed capital markets, increased transparency (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Doidge et al., 2009b;
Gozzi et al., 2008; Lel and Miller, 2008). Lee and Valero (2010) show the increase in the intensity
of analyst coverage of ADR programs and this coverage is strongly pronounced for exchange listed
ADRs.
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By cross-listing in the U.S. foreign ﬁrms overcome market segmentation and most importantly,
bond with the U.S. legal regulatory environment, considered stricter and more informative (Doidge
et al., 2004; Doidge, 2004; Coffee, 1999; Reese and Weisbach, 2002).
There are various explanations why foreign ﬁrms cross-list in the U.S. According to the bonding
hypothesis, foreign ﬁrms list in the U.S. to legally bond themselves with a stronger regulatory envi-
ronment, which is a form of functional convergence (Coffee, 1999, 2002) while the ﬁrm maintains its
listing in the home market, thus allowing testing of both systems. Typically, ﬁrms from countries with
weak investor protection cross-list on markets with stronger protection (Abdallah and Goergen, 2008).
Similarly, Lee and Valero (2010) show the increase in analyst coverage for ADR programs is mostly
for ﬁrms from countries with greater information asymmetry and weaker legal traditions. With cross-
listing foreign ﬁrms can “leapfrog” their country’s weak legal institutions by listing equity in the U.S.
and voluntarily abiding by U.S. security laws (Siegel, 2005). However, this assumes that the destination
country’s regulatory structures can be transplanted which does not always work well (Licht, 2003a,b).
The opposing view from bonding is that ﬁrms apply an “avoiding hypothesis” suggesting that ﬁrms
purposely avoid cross-listing in more highly regulated countries. Many foreign ﬁrms that list in the
U.S. are required to comply with strict disclosure requirements that require much more information
than their respective domestic country. Compliance with this regulation sends a positive signal and
therefore is beneﬁcial to the company (Fuerst, 1998). Furthermore, listing in U.S. leads to a decreased
overall risk. Akhigbe et al. (2009) show that the capital market measures of total risk and unsystematic
risk decreased during the three-year period following the adoption of SOX, suggesting that investor
uncertainty was reduced and therefore the markets post-SOX.
Another well cited reason for ﬁrms to choose to cross-list is to take advantage of less expensive
sources of capital away from their home country or simply to increase the number of potential capital
sources. Firms cross-list to achieve access to a more developed capital market reducing the dependence
on internally generated cash ﬂows. Often the U.S. capital markets provide opportunities for ﬁrms to
raise capital at lower costs. The U.S. also has the added beneﬁt of a more developed capital market
offering more liquidity, depth, and an enhanced shareholder base (Lins et al., 2003). Firms with higher
growth opportunities should receive higher beneﬁts from cross-listing and research supports this, by
showing that U.S. cross-listed ﬁrms have a Tobin’s Q seventeen percent higher than foreign ﬁrms that
are not cross-listed in U.S. (Doidge et al., 2004).2
The set of beneﬁts from a U.S. listing is partially offset by the costs associated with the implemen-
tation of SOX in 2002 which raised questions on the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets (Marosi
and Massoud, 2008). Cross-listing is associated with additional compliance and exchange listing costs.
Cross-listing should be optimal if the beneﬁts exceed the costs. Pre-SOX, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) treated foreign issuers differently than domestic issuers (Perino, 2005). However,
when SOX was approved by Congress, the same disclosure and corporate governance requirements
were applied to both domestic and foreign issuers. The implementation of SOX generates substantial
costs of compliance related to additional legal fees, disclosure, auditing and corporate restructuring
(Perino, 2005; Riebstein, 2003). Furthermore, Witmer (2006) shows that ﬁrms are more likely to vol-
untarily cross-delist after 2001, overall ﬁrms that cross-delist have a higher proportion of trading
volume in their home market, the ﬁrms are from countries with weaker investor protection, and they
exhibit lower Tobin’s Q. Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) and Witmer (2006) all report increased levels
of foreign delistings following the adoption of SOX. These delistings are attributable primarily to sharp
increase in compliance costs associated with SOX (e.g. Zhang, 2007; Linck et al., 2009; Wintoki, 2007),
foreign listings have been shown to enhance the value of the ﬁrm though cross-listing premium. It fol-
lows naturally, that foreign delisting from U.S. markets should reduce ﬁrm value. Liu (2004) shows that
2 Further, Doidge (2004) provides support for bonding hypothesis by showing that foreign ﬁrms that cross-list shares in
U.S.  have voting premiums that are 43% higher than foreign ﬁrms that do not cross-list – explained by lower private beneﬁts
of  control for majority shareholders that cross-list in U.S. Along the same lines, Doidge et al. (2009b) show that ﬁrms with
controlling insiders that have higher controlling rights in relation to cash ﬂow rights are less likely to seek listing in U.S.
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there has been a signiﬁcant drop in stock prices upon the announcement of a delisting decision.3 Litvak
(2007a,b) shows that ﬁrms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges experienced signiﬁcant negative abnormal
returns in response to the passage of SOX legislation. Several authors document the trend of foreign
delistings from U.S. capital markets primarily for small ﬁrms, lower growth opportunities and from
countries with weaker investor protection (Marosi and Massoud, 2008; Piotroski and Srinivasan, 2008;
Witmer, 2006). Furthermore, Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) show that U.S. exchanges experienced
outﬂow of foreign listings except for large proﬁtable ﬁrms from emerging markets.
More recently, Doidge et al. (2010) show that foreign ﬁrms cross-listed in the U.S. delist for several
reasons – they have low growth opportunities (current and future) or they no longer require external
funds to ﬁnance their growth. Cross-listing in U.S. provides protection to minority shareholders and
limits the private beneﬁts of control, hence ﬁrms delist when there is insider dominance in the decision
making, allowing insiders to gain more beneﬁts after delisting (Doidge et al., 2010).
2.2. The impact of culture
It has been suggested in the literature that the traditional explanation for cross-listing and delisting
behavior do not completely explain the full array of factors that drive the motivation to cross-list or
delist (Licht, 2003a,b). It has been observed that companies cross-list in countries that are culturally
similar (Pagano et al., 2002). It is also evident that companies prefer to cross-list in countries that are
familiar in geography, language, business structure, common history, etc. (Sarkissian and Schill, 2003).
But even with this information it is not obvious how and why  some companies chose to cross-list in
the U.S. versus other countries. The idea of measuring cultural similarity is more challenging yet we
know that culture has an impact on investor behavior (Chui et al., 2010).
Among the cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede (2003),  individualism is the most closely
related to overconﬁdence and self-attribution bias and therefore can be used as a proxy for investor
self-conﬁdence (Chui et al., 2010). In addition to conﬁdence, a highly individualistic mentality leads
to ambition and strong determination in pursuing personal goals, interests (including maximizing
their private beneﬁts) and therefore individualistic societies are associated with higher agency cost
(Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2008). Hence we focus our study on the impact of the individualism index on the
cross-delisting behavior of foreign ﬁrms pre- and post-SOX.
There are numerous studies in the psychology literature explaining the components of individual-
istic versus collectivistic societies and the differences in decision making in these two cultural groups.
In this paper we focus on the impact of culture and SOX on the decision to delist. Several requirements
of SOX directly contradict practices in foreign countries. For example, Section 301 of SOX requires
issuers to have a wholly independent audit committee that hires and oversees the auditors and to
maintain that independent status by changing auditors periodically. Contrary to this requirement,
supervisory boards of companies in some foreign countries (e.g. Germany) are allowed to appoint
auditors at the annual shareholder meeting (Riebstein, 2003). In addition, Section 302 of SOX allo-
cates ultimate responsibility for the accuracy of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial statements to the CEO and CFO,
while in some foreign countries this task resides with the board (Perino, 2005).
Also, human resources and hiring practices differ across countries based on the level of individ-
ualism/collectivism. In individualistic countries, hiring is based on the rational models that predict
the potential for successful job performance of the candidate (Muchinsky, 2000). In collectivistic soci-
eties, on the other hand, the hiring decision is based on long standing relationships and commitments.
Triandis and Vassiliou (1972) show that, for example in Greece, upon hiring employers gave preferen-
tial weight to friends and relatives recommendation as opposed to objectively evaluating the potential
of the candidates. Furthermore, Erez (1994) shows that in collectivistic cultures jobs tend to be orga-
nized around a cohesive work group. This is in direct contrast to the SOX requirement that the CEO
and CFO sign off on the accuracy of ﬁnancial reporting as opposed to a team.
3 Delisting U.S. ﬁrms experience stock prices drop of 8.5% after delisting from exchange trading, shareholders face a tremen-
dous increase in trading, a signiﬁcant decline in liquidity and loss in shareholder wealth (Sanger and Peterson, 1990; Angel
et  al., 2004).
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Kashima and Callan (1994) show that in collectivist cultures decisions are more likely to be made
by a group and Chen et al. (1998) point out that in collectivist societies decisions will not be optimal
if a culpable individual can be identiﬁed.
3. Hypotheses development
3.1. The impact of culture
While the propensity of ﬁrms to cross-list is based on raising capital, access to a broader investor
base and differences in legal regulations, these reasons do not explain the behavior of ﬁrms over
time nor do they account for other variables not directly observable in legal bonding or ﬁnan-
cial beneﬁts research. Licht (2003a,b) refers to cross-listing as “legal transplants” and suggests the
ﬁt between the country of domicile overall investor attitude (here described as culture) will play
a role in the ﬁrm’s decision to cross-list and subsequently delist. Finance literature has already
shown the increased likelihood of listing in a culturally similar foreign environment (Pagano et al.,
2001).
A greater cultural distance is associated with less familiarity (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010) and
Huberman (2001) suggests that domestic investors familiar with their domestic markets and stocks
may feel a sense of discomfort of owning foreign stocks. Furthermore, greater cultural distance may
lead to not even investing in the foreign stocks (Loree and Guisinger, 1995; Sethi et al., 2003). Therefore
cross-listing in the U.S. is a mechanism through which foreign stocks gain recognition in the U.S. and
overcome cultural distance. Therefore we expect that:
H1.  Firms from countries culturally distant from the U.S. are less likely to delist.
Furthermore, we focus on one speciﬁc dimensions of culture – individualism which is the most
comprehensive and widely studied variable among Hofstede’s ﬁve cultural dimensions (Chui et al.,
2010). Individualism measures the extent to which people rely on themselves and their own  ability
as opposed to the success of a group. Individualism is highly correlated with the ability to take risk.
Cross-listing in the U.S. offers a set of bonding beneﬁts and therefore delisting will be associated with
a potential risk of losing the investor trust and high valuation (that came with the initial cross-listing).
Individualism is related to tendency for risk taking (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010). Furthermore, Shupp
and Williams (2008) ﬁnd that groups are more risk averse than individuals in high risk situations and
that therefore we expect that managers from highly individualistic countries will exhibit risk taking
behavior.
Based on studies from the psychology literature, there is a direct relationship between individu-
alistic mentality and investor conﬁdence (Chui et al., 2010) and therefore we expect that ﬁrms from
countries with a higher individualism score will have a higher conﬁdence in their ability to succeed
after the initial reputation boost of listing shares in the U.S. and will be more likely to subsequently
delist.
H2. Firms from individualistic societies are more likely to delist.
3.2. Culture and SOX
The passage of SOX leads to strengthening of the disclosure requirements for all ﬁrms (including
foreign issuers) and better monitoring and control of accounting practices. It brings a new set of
legal requirements that may  lead to reorganization of the business practices especially for ﬁrms from
countries in which SOX contradicts commonly accepted organization routines. In fact, SOX brings a
shift in corporate culture and we expect that post-SOX the culture of the country of domicile will
have an impact on the delisting behavior of foreign ﬁrms. Foreign ﬁrms listed in the U.S. are subject to
the same requirements as domestic ﬁrms which include organizational components such as requiring
independent auditors and assigning responsibility for the accuracy and reliability of ﬁnancial reports
to the CEO. Foreign ﬁrms listed in the U.S. will be mandated to comply with SOX and therefore change
their practices and eliminate corporate behavior that might be speciﬁc to their culture. Because of the
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high cost of compliance with U.S. regulations post-SOX, speciﬁcally for countries with high cultural
distance from the U.S. we  expect that these ﬁrms will seek alternative source of capital and visibility
and thus:
H3.  Post-SOX, ﬁrms from countries culturally distant from the U.S. are more likely to delist.
Furthermore, the passage of SOX creates a conﬁdence boost for the ﬁrms that were able to sustain
their U.S. listing and comply with SOX regulations. This is particularly true for the investors in the
country of domicile of the foreign ﬁrms cross-listing in the U.S. One of the consequences of SOX
was the improved investor conﬁdence in the home country of ﬁrms cross-listed in the U.S. (Litvak,
2007a,b). Because individualism is closely related to conﬁdence we expect that SOX will impact the
propensity of foreign delisting based on the level of individualism in the country of domicile. Foreign
ﬁrms from individualistic countries listed in the U.S. will have the conﬁdence that they will be able
to manage SOX compliance and remain competitive and therefore will not ﬂee the U.S. post-SOX.
Conﬁdence is associated with faith in past decisions and the ability to maintain proﬁtability. Further,
ﬁrms from individualistic societies are associated with higher degree of agency (Fidrmuc and Jacob,
2010) and complying with SOX regulation sends a strong signal to investors, possibly mitigating the
cost of information asymmetry and ultimately maintaining listing in the U.S. post-SOX as the desirable
outcome. Therefore we expect that:
H4. Post-SOX, ﬁrms from individualistic countries are less likely to delist.
3.3. Value implications
Doidge et al. (2004) show that there is a cross-listing premium for foreign ﬁrms cross-listing in
the U.S. The process of delisting from the U.S. capital markets is associated with a delisting discount.
However, post-SOX foreign ﬁrms listed in the U.S. might be searching for alternative locations for cross-
listing due to the high compliance costs associated with SOX. Therefore, we  expect the implementation
of SOX will not signiﬁcantly impact the delisting discount.
H5. SOX does not signiﬁcantly impact the delisting discount of foreign ﬁrms that are cross-delisting
from U.S. capital markets.
4. Sample description
Data of delisted ADR programs is provided by the Bank of New York. The data contains 1419 foreign
ADRs and 287 companies with terminated ADR programs between 2000 and 2010. The ﬁle provides
the initiation date for each ADR program and the termination date. In addition, this ﬁle is matched and
cross-checked with data from CitiBank in order to obtain the complete list of terminated depository
receipt programs in the U.S.
For each of these ﬁrms, annual accounting data is retrieved from Compustat Global. Country-speciﬁc
variables are obtained from Djankov et al. (2008).
To ﬁnd the determinants of the ADR terminations we compare the characteristics of foreign
companies that terminate their ADRs with a control sample of all foreign ﬁrms that have cur-
rently active ADR programs regardless of the time they originally listed. The sample of foreign
ﬁrms with terminated ADRs consists of 287 ﬁrms terminating their ADRs between 2000 and 2010,
and the control sample consists of 1419 active ADRs. Foreign ﬁrms can sell their shares on the
NYSE, NASDAQ, OTC market and using PORTAL – private placements to qualiﬁed institution buyers
(QIB).
Cross-listing in the U.S. is possible through four sponsoring banks – Bank of New York, CitiBank,
Deutsche Bank, and J.P. Morgan Chase. Table 1 shows the ﬁrms in the listed and delisted sam-
ple by country – this table is by ﬁrm year level presenting the average Market-to-Book and
assets for the observations from the panel data. On average, delisting ﬁrms have lower Market-
to-Book, consistent with the notion of a cross-listing premium (and therefore, cross-delisting
discount).
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Table 1
Sample description. Firm year data on cross-listed and delisted ﬁrms.
Cross-listed during
sample period
Delisted during sample
period
Revised
antidirector
index
Culture
distance
Indivi-
dualism
N MB Assets N MB Assets
Argentina 14 1.20 $18,568.05 4 0.85 $3,813.44 0.34 15.29 46
Australia 164 2.10 $1,586.20 26 2.16 $2,007.51 0.76 1.64 90
Austria 16 1.35 $10,596.19 4 1.26 $1,142.61 0.21 13.70 55
Belgium 19 1.50 $30,819.52 1 1.00 $1,690.24 0.54 14.25 75
Brazil 42 2.61 $59,575.34 16 1.77 $4,959.32 0.27 17.17 38
Chile 7 2.34 $701,308.75 8 3.29 $626,976.53 0.63 22.23 23
Denmark 15 2.00 $12,854.05 2 1.30 $64,999.78 0.46 14.62 74
Egypt 1 2.52 $45,302.74 0.20
Finland 21 1.34 $8,986.28 0.46 11.98 63
France 58 1.55 $24,215.27 14 1.32 $2,058.06 0.38 14.02 71
Germany 53 1.50 $14,506.23 14 2.06 $732.87 0.28 7.82 67
Greece 10 2.05 $136,157.51 0.22 22.24 35
Hong Kong 38 1.73 $14,994.94 4 1.00 $10,446.31 0.96 18.46 25
India 101 1.37 $45,283.54 5 2.07 $41,951.77 0.58 14.34 48
Ireland 10 1.53 $9,132.82 5 1.45 $1,468.76 0.79 6.81 70
Israel 15 2.44 $5,647.85 2 1.05 $5,925.13 0.73 14.89 54
Italy 28 1.32 $856,849.80 6 1.29 $375.92 0.42 8.77 76
Japan 217 1.43 $1,011,877.18 19 1.28 $1,062,738.95 0.50 18.42 46
Korea 10 1.25 $2,310,372.41 0.47 22.05 18
Luxembourg 2 2.32 $111,814.27 5 1.31 $17,978.23 0.28 10.25 60
Malaysia 8 1.38 $9,475.11 4 1.57 $16,193.48 0.95 23.14 26
Mexico 27 1.22 $82,837.02 15 1.24 $17,701.64 0.17 20.54 30
Netherlands 23 1.68 $11,988.70 13 1.17 $2,086.19 0.20 12.44 80
New Zealand 26 1.63 $1,807.71 4 0.90 $282.29 0.95 5.55 79
Norway 23 2.05 $32,228.72 5 1.19 $4,454.03 0.42 14.78 69
Philippines 10 1.16 $82,392.20 2 1.21 $38,927.28 0.22 20.01 32
Poland 11 1.49 $5,590.76 4 1.09 $17,776.60 0.29 15.73 60
Portugal 13 1.16 $203,297.41 1 1.49 $4,043.35 0.44 23.65 27
Russia 39 0.98 $95,556.05 4 0.69 $88,325.29 0.44 23.17 39
Singapore 47 1.68 $38,895.35 1 5.64 $1,591.62 1.00 22.13 20
Slovak
Republic
0.72 $54,152.63 1 1.05 $56,773.17 0.29 22.29 52
South Africa 50 1.76 $11,557.28 10 1.74 $21,095.75 0.81 6.92 65
Spain 24 1.45 $295,572.82 3 1.22 $279,396.38 0.37 15.59 51
Sweden 27 1.74 $25,349.30 4 2.61 $1,378.62 0.33 15.85 71
Switzerland 24 2.11 $7,367.69 4 2.64 $18,298.74 0.27 6.95 68
Taiwan 33 1.62 $115,410.59 8 1.20 $98,256.91 0.56 20.34 17
Thailand 12 1.52 $39,662.88 0.81 20.50 20
Turkey 19 1.98 $1,185,478.10 0.43 18.37 37
United
Kingdom
161 1.89 $4,212.70 65 1.88 $2,194.05 0.95 3.22 89
Venezuela 2 1.28 $691,861.45 3 0.71 $14,537.63 0.09 23.64 12
This table reports the number, average Market-to-Book, and average assets for foreign ﬁrms that listed and delisted in (or
from) the U.S. over the sample period 2000–2004. Market-to-Book is calculated as (Total assets − Book equity + Market value
of  equity)/Total assets. Revised antidirector rights index is from Djankov et al. (2008). Culture distance is measured as the
Cartesian distance (based on four cultural dimensions) between U.S. and the country of domicile. Individualism index is from
Hofstede (1991).
Table 1 shows the number of delisted ﬁrms and the number of ﬁrms maintaining a U.S.
listing by country during our sample period. Consistent with other studies, the highest num-
ber of cross-listed ﬁrms come from Japan, United Kingdom, Australia, India and France and
the highest number of delisted ﬁrms is from the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Brazil and
Mexico.
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5. Empirical results
5.1. Determinants of cross-delisting and impact of SOX
In this section we study the propensity of foreign ﬁrms already listed in U.S. markets to delist.
We build on the existing model of cross-listing, based on the legal system of the country of domicile
and growth opportunities (Doidge et al., 2009a,b) and add cultural variables. The decision to delist is
determined by several company and country speciﬁc factors. The company speciﬁc factors measure
the growth opportunities through Market-to-Book, two-year annualized Sales Growth, and the age
of the listing of the ﬁrms. We  use leverage (measured as debt/assets) as a control variable. The legal
origin dummy  variable measures whether the ﬁrm belongs to a country with civil or common legal
origin and we use the revised anti-director rights index (Djankov et al., 2008) to measure the level of
shareholder protection in foreign countries. And last, we add a measure of the cultural distance and
individualism index. We  deﬁne culture distance as the Cartesian difference of the culture dimension
variables. Hofstede has deﬁned 5 culture variables (dimensions) and in fact 4 of them are reasonable
proxies for the dimensions of cultural development – power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoid-
ance and individualism (the 5th one – long term orientation – was created later for a limited set of
countries and is not widely used). We  followed the approach of Chakrabarti et al. (2009) who  use the
Cartesian difference between the four dimensions of culture and thus constructed a single variable
that is used as a proxy for culture differences. We  use a logit regression model of the following form:
Likelihood of ADR termination = f [Assets, Leverage, Market-to-Book, Sales growth,
age dummy, SOX, Legal origin dummy, Revised anti-director rights index, culture variables]
The results are presented in Table 2. In Model 1 we study the impact of ﬁrm and country speciﬁc
variables on the propensity of foreign ﬁrms to delist. Consistent with Doidge et al. (2010) we ﬁnd
that ﬁrms with growth opportunities (as measured by Market-to-Book)4 are less likely to delist likely
because they need access to a well developed capital markets in order to ﬁnance their growth. Firms
from civil law countries (associated with weaker investor protection) are more likely to delist. In Model
2 we add the impact of SOX and our results suggest that post-SOX, overall ﬁrms are more likely to
terminate their ADR programs, consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Model 3 shows the interaction between country legal dummy  variables and SOX and the results
suggest that while ﬁrms from civil law countries are more likely to delist pre-SOX, post-SOX they
are less likely to delist. These results can be explained possibly with the need for bonding with the
stronger regulatory system and the overall poor market valuation in ﬁrms from civil law countries.
The impact of culture on the decision to delist is shown in Models 4 through 7 of Table 2. Model
4 shows that ﬁrms from countries that are culturally different from the U.S. are less likely to delist,
consistent with Hypothesis 1. This result is consistent with the notion that ﬁrms list shares in coun-
tries that are culturally similar (Sarkissian and Schill, 2003), investors prefer to invest in shares from
countries that are familiar and cross-listing is a tool to create a level of familiarity of the foreign shares
in the U.S. and to mitigate the home-bias of U.S. investors. Model 5 of Table 2 shows that this rela-
tionship is reversed post-SOX, consistent with Hypotheses 2. This result implies that the high costs of
compliance with SOX regulation possibly lead to increase in foreign ﬁrm delisting shares from the U.S.
Compliance with SOX is expensive for any ﬁrm however this cost is even higher for foreign ﬁrms that
are culturally distant from the U.S. because SOX will likely mandate changes in the common business
practices in addition to the legal, administrative and reporting fees.
Next, we study the impact of country individualism on the propensity of foreign ﬁrms to delist
shares from the U.S. Model 6 in Table 2 shows that ﬁrms from individualistic societies have a higher
4 Market-to-Book here is industry adjusted. In addition, all company speciﬁc variables, including Market-to-Book are “purged”
from  the impact of country speciﬁc variables. This is done by running a linear regression model with dependent variable each
of  the company speciﬁc variables, and a set of country speciﬁc explanatory variables. The residuals from this regression (ﬁrst
pass)  were used in the logit model, which in fact is a “second pass” of the analysis presented here.
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Table 3
Logit analysis on the likelihood of ADR terminations before and after SOX.
Parameter M1 M2 M3 M4
Intercept 2.2008 1.9397 0.4306 1.5778
(<.0001) (0.0003) (0.3244) (<.0001)
Log(assets) −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0002
(0.1029) (0.0352) (0.0139) (0.0195)
Debt/assets −1.2499 −1.1744 −0.6418 −0.5714
(0.1117) (0.1432) (0.1666) (0.2170)
Market-to-Book 0.0112 0.0197 0.0177 0.0152
(0.7348) (0.6975) (0.6124) (0.6272)
Sales  growth −0.0699 −0.1038 −0.0778 −0.0786
(0.7513) (0.6674) (0.5912) (0.6007)
Civil  law −1.3257 −0.7095 −0.7952
(0.0956) (0.1426) (0.0987)
Revised antidirector index 1.4187 1.2310 1.1879
(0.2937) (0.1336) (0.1464)
Culture distance 0.0407
(0.0400)
Individualism −0.0101
(0.0627)
The sample consists of 287 ﬁrms that cross-delisted from USA between 2000 and 2010. The dependent variable is SOX equal to
1  if the ﬁrm cross-delisted after SOX and equal to 0 if the ﬁrm cross-delisted before SOX. The positive coefﬁcient estimates of
the  explanatory variable indicate that the ﬁrm is more likely cross-delist after SOX and negative coefﬁcient estimates indicate
that  the ﬁrm is less likely cross-delist after SOX and more likely to cross-delist before SOX. Market-to-Book ratio is computed
as  ((Total assets − Book equity) + Market value of equity)/Total assets. Old is a dummy  variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm has been
listed for more than 6 years. Civil dummy  equal 1 if the ﬁrm is from a country with civil law tradition. P-values reported in
parentheses.
propensity to delist, consistent with our Hypothesis 3. That is explainable with the high level of conﬁ-
dence that even without the additional beneﬁts of U.S. listing, foreign ﬁrms will be able to succeed in
their home market. In addition, managers from individualistic societies are risk taking and proactive
and likely will ﬁnd other sources of capital hence they are conﬁdent about their success even without
the extra boost of U.S. cross-listing.
Model 7 shows the impact of SOX on the delisting behavior of ﬁrms from individualistic countries.
Post-SOX ﬁrms from countries with individualistic societies are less likely to delist, consistent with
Hypothesis 4. Managers in individualistic countries tend to be overaggressive in their decisions, the
individualistic mindset allows for more managerial opportunism and higher agency cost (Fidrmuc and
Jacob, 2010) and possibly compliance with SOX mitigates the potential for agency conﬂicts and sends
a strong signal to both domestic and U.S. investors. Furthermore, managerial conﬁdence to a degree
is related to persistence and faith in their past decision.
Next, we provide an alternative method for studying the impact of SOX on the delisting. We con-
struct a subsample consisting only of ﬁrms that cross-delist. The purpose of this analysis is to study
the company and country speciﬁc factors that determine the type of ﬁrms that would cross-delist
program after SOX. For this purpose, we perform a logit regression analysis in which the dependent
variable is SOX and the independent variables are country and company speciﬁc variables:
Likelihood of ADR termination after SOX = f [Log(Assets),  Debt/Assets, Market-to-Book,
Sales growth,  Legal origin dummy, Country market quality variables, Culture variables]
The results are presented in Table 3. Model 1 shows that ﬁrms with high Market-to-Book are more
likely to cross-delist after SOX. Model 2 shows that ﬁrms from civil law countries are less likely to
delist post-SOX compared to pre-SOX. Model 3 shows that post-SOX ﬁrms from culturally distant
countries from U.S. are more likely to delist, consistent with Hypothesis 3. Model 4 shows that ﬁrms
from individualistic societies are less likely to delist post-SOX, consistent with our Hypothesis 4.
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This result is consistent with the bonding hypothesis. Civil law countries provide weaker protection
for the minority shareholders, consistent with La Porta et al. (1998).  In order to cross-list in the U.S.
these ﬁrms have to comply with regulatory requirements of the U.S. and therefore “bond” themselves
with a stronger governance system. It might be that the providers of capital in these ﬁrms require the
U.S. cross-listing and also cross-listings help increase the reputation and trustworthiness of the ﬁrms.
5.2. The impact of SOX on duration of ADR programs
After analyzing the impact of SOX on the determinants of ADR terminations, we focus on the impact
of SOX on the duration of existence of ADR terminations. This is performed using a time dependent
hazard model. It measures the factors that impact the survival distribution function after a certain
period of time t:
S(t) = Pr(T ≥ t)
Survivors are existing cross-listed ﬁrms and non survivors are ﬁrms that have been present in the
U.S. capital markets but have delisted. This is a time dependent hazard model which measured the
impact of SOX on the duration of U.S. listings. The sample for this analysis consists of delisted ﬁrms
that were initially listed in the U.S. pre-SOX. The hazard model provides comparison of the duration
of listing for ﬁrms delisting pre-SOX to the duration of listing for ﬁrms delisting post-SOX. Both of
these groups of ﬁrms are listed under the same circumstances (pre-SOX). The results are presented
in Table 4.5 The status variable indicates the increased risk of failure, i.e. the increased propensity to
delist over time. The signiﬁcant negative SOX dummy  indicates signiﬁcant shortening of the time of
the U.S. listing existence after SOX.
5.3. Value impact of culture, SOX on the decision to cross-delist
This section is focused on the value discount created by the ADR termination process. Previous
research shows the cross-listing premium. Doidge et al. (2004) deﬁne the cross-listing premium as
the increase in Market-to-Book for cross-listed foreign ﬁrms compared to non cross-listed foreign
ﬁrms. In the case of cross-delisting, we expect the opposite effect – decrease in Market-to-Book for
the delisting ﬁrms.
We  use a mixed ﬁxed and random effects regression (Henderson, 1990; Searle et al., 1992) in the
following form:
Y = Xˇ + Z + ε
In the above equation, Y is a vector (NT × 1) ﬁrm-year Market-to-Book multiples of cross-listed and
delisted foreign ﬁrms over the sample period. X is a matrix of (NT × J) ﬁrm-country speciﬁc explanatory
variables and the corresponding (J × 1) coefﬁcient vector  represents the ﬁxed effects. The set of ﬁrm-
country speciﬁc variables falls within two groups – the ﬁrst group indicates the U.S. listing status of
the ﬁrm (listed or delisted) and the second group – ﬁrm speciﬁc variables (such as sales growth, assets,
leverage).
Z is a matrix of country dummy  variables constructed as follows: each row in Z consists of K
indicator variables which equal to 1 if the foreign ﬁrm is domiciled in country k and 0 otherwise.  is a
(K × 1) vector that represents the unknown random effects – the unobserved country-speciﬁc Market-
to-Book valuation multiples. Therefore, Z measures the difference in Market-to-Book multiples of
foreign ﬁrms across countries.
The estimation is in two stages – in stage 1,  is estimated as linear projection of Z onto the space
of Y and in the second stage  is estimated as a linear projection of the residual Y − Z on X.
The results are presented in Table 5. The results show that the delisting discount persists after
controlling for ﬁrms and country speciﬁc effects. Model 1 shows the higher Market-to-Book ratio of
5 Due to data availability from Bank of New York this table is based on a sample from 2000 till 2004.
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Table 5
Value regression of the delisting discount.
M1 M2 M3 M4  M5  M6
Intercept 1.2246 1.2244 1.8198 1.7214 1.2766 1.6693
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Delist −0.1424 −0.1348 −0.1449 −0.0664 −0.0879 −0.0839
(<.0001) (0.0957) (<.0001) (0.2900) (0.3141) (0.3366)
Individualism 0.0041 0.0041 0.0033
(0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0824)
Individualism ×delist −0.0001
(0.9193)
Culture distance −0.0157 −0.0175 −0.0134
(<.0001) (0.0215) (0.0809)
Culture distance ×delist −0.0062
(0.1663)
Delist × SOX −0.0633 −0.0690
(0.4961) (0.4583)
Individualism × SOX 0.0016
(0.0001)
Culture distance × SOX −0.0083
(<.0001)
SOX  0.1055 0.1056 0.0972 0.1054 0.0131 0.2112
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.6150) (<.0001)
Log(assets) −0.0919 −0.0919 −0.0361 −0.0920 −0.0930 −0.0935
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.1452) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Sales  growth −0.0005 −0.0005 −0.0004 −0.0005 −0.0005 −0.0004
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Civil  law 0.1860 0.1860 0.2510 0.1358 0.1883 0.1376
(0.2022) (0.2021) (<.0001) (0.3641) (0.1972) (0.3588)
Revised antidirector index −0.0612 −0.0612 −0.3296 −0.0729 −0.0641 −0.0719
(0.8186) (0.8187) (<.0001) (0.7828) (0.8105) (0.7862)
The dependent variable in this regression is Market-to-Book. The independent variable delist is a dummy  variable equal to 1
if  the ﬁrm has cross-delisted and 0 otherwise. Therefore, delist dummy  measure the addition or deduction to Market-to-Book
due  to the delisting process. The rest of the variables follow the deﬁnition in Table 3. P-values reported in parentheses.
ﬁrms from individualistic countries as expected. Model 2 of Table 5 suggests delisting ﬁrms from indi-
vidualistic societies do not experience signiﬁcant change in the delisting discount. Models 4 and 5
show that overall ﬁrms from countries culturally distant from U.S. experience very small (economi-
cally insigniﬁcant) discount in Market-to-Book and the degree of individualism does not signiﬁcantly
impact the delisting discount. Models 5 and 6 suggest that post-SOX ﬁrms from individualistic societies
experience slight increase in Market-to-Book valuation and ﬁrms from culturally distant countries
experience a decline in their valuation.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we provide an explanation of the determinants of ADR terminations and the impact of
SOX on these determinants. Our results suggest that in addition to the ﬁnancial and legal explanation,
culture plays an important role in the delisting decisions of foreign ﬁrms. Furthermore, the inter-
action between culture distance and SOX may  determine the attractiveness of U.S. capital markets.
These ﬁndings are important because more than three quarters of the foreign countries (30 out of 39)
with available culture indicator scores are culturally signiﬁcantly different from U.S. The increased
compliance costs of SOX may  drive foreign ﬁrms to alternative locations to ﬁnance their growth and
to increase their international reputation. However, it is clear the U.S. capital markets have not lost
their attractiveness as an environment that provides opportunity for ﬁrms from countries with weaker
investor protection to bond themselves with a stronger regulatory environment. The cultural aspects
play just as important role in the decision of the ﬁrm to cross-list or delist. We  found that the propen-
sity to delist is lower for ﬁrms from countries with cultural similarities to the U.S. and higher for
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ﬁrms from individualistic societies. Interestingly, after the implementation of SOX we  observed the
“reversal of fortunes” in which foreign ﬁrms’ delisting behavior if driven by the opposite forces.
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